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Introduction
This volume reports on a conference held in October 1987 that
brought together labor, management, academic and other interested
observers of the changing scene that characterizes the U.S. transportation
sector. The list of the participants is attached and we were fortunate to
have key perspectives on hand from railroads, trucking, airlines and
maritime. We used a seminar approach with wide ranging discussion of
background papers dealing with the different sectors. Over the past year
and a half the discussants and commentators have put their thoughts to
paper and we thank them for their diligence that has made this volume
possible.
In organizing the conference a small planning committee within the
Center for Transportation Studies was guided by the premise that
deregulation had been operative (in varying degrees) for sufficient time in
railroads, trucking and airlines to provide an opportunity for assessment and
to take stock about the future, specifically, the upcoming decade of the
1990s.
As will be elaborated shortly the impact of deregulation has been
both substantial and complex. And the pattern is not the same for each
of the sectors. Indeed, a challenging task is to understand differences
across the various modes of transportation. And within a particular sector
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distinct differences can be observed or to put it differently one of the
interesting impacts of deregulation has been the creation of a "structure of
new opportunities" and as a result different companies are pursuing
different strategies. We are interested in understanding these important
choice points and the implications of the different directions being followed
by major companies.
While the major changes brought about by deregulation will continue
to unfold, it is our belief that we are witnessing the end of what might-be
considered the first phase of the post-deregulation era. For example, the
consolidation of airline companies into mega-carriers has probably run its
course. Similarly, in trucking we may continue to see additional
bankruptcies but probably not at anywhere near the high rate of exits
from the industry as was the case during the first several years after the
passage of the deregulation act for trucking.
Exactly what will characterize the next phase and even more
importantly the long term period within the transportation industry (under
an umbrella of more competitive markets) is not easy to discern in precise
terms. The nature of the challenge is clear, however, and we have some
views about the ingredients of a successful response.
To telegraph our central message that will be developed throughout
this volume, we believe that it is fundamentally important for companies,
employees and unions - indeed, all of the stakeholders - to work together
creatively to realize a new synthesis and alignment between the business
and human objectives of the enterprise.
This concept can be better understood by contrast to the way in
which the linkages between the market, business strategy and human
resource/industrial relations strategy have changed first from a regulated
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period to the first phase of a deregulated industry and now to the longer
run quest for viability. The attached diagram captures these distinct
differences.
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In a regulated regime the relationships were rather straight
forward. Increases in compensation and fringes bargained by the
respective unions were for the most part passed on into higher fares and
tariffs. Wages thus were taken out of competition and all of the economic
parameters were stable.
In the period immediately following deregulation the unleashing of
competitive pressures placed business strategies into play and many
companies quickly turned to seeking concessions from their unions in an
effort to solve their financial problems by reducing costs. The
consequences of this (as we will elaborate shortly) have been substantial
for workers and their union representatives.
The future holds the possibility of a different configuration,
however. Both management and labor can be seen as linked in a
3
. . .
Ill
relationship that is searching for workable policies and programs that will
produce viability for all of the stakeholders within a highly competitive
environment. The themes of service, quality, productivity improvement, and
commitment become central ideas for what might be called a new
partnership.
Frankly, we can not point to very many situations that have
fashioned such new relationships. There are suggestions of this new
possibility in the steps that are being pursued by several railroad, trucking
and airline companies. Interestingly, one of the most intriguing models
comes from overseas in the experience of the maritime industry in countries
like Japan and Scandinavia. In this regard the paper by Michael Gaffney in
this volume is so important. The U.S. maritime industry may be frozen in a
time warp but its counterparts in other countries are evidencing
considerable experimention and progress.
Assessing the Impact of Deregulation: The Initial Phase
Volumes could (and have) been written about the impact of
deregulation on the transportation industry. Our purpose is to present
some summary points and to emphasize some of the differences across
railroads, trucking and airlines. For more elaboration the reader is
referred to the three chapters written respectively by Gerard McCullough,
Nancy Rose and Peter Cappelli.
Over-the-Road Trucking - By many measures over-the-road trucking has
experienced the most change as a result of deregulation. Weintraub notes
that during the first several years of deregulation there had been 80
bankruptcies affecting over 100,000 workers. Rose indicates that the
return on investment for the sector has dropped from approximately 17% to
under 10%.
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On the compensation side of the employment relationship, there have
been sharp reductions at a number of carriers as workers have accepted
wage cuts of 15% (in exchange for stock) as a way of forestalling
bankruptcy. At the level of the industry-wide agreement, various freezes
and diversions of normally scheduled increases into pension and welfare
funds have had the cumulative effect of reducing the compensation premium
paid in the union sector as compared to the nonunion sector from
approximately 50% to 30% (see the paper by Rose).
The implications for union membership have been dramatic. Rose
estimates that union density in over-the-road trucking dropped from
approximately 60% to 30% over the past 10 years. For the less-than-load
(LTL) segment the Teamsters maintain that their representation has
remained at about 70%. However, considerable employment has shifted to
the truckload (TL) sector, which is largely unorganized. Also, it appears
that a considerable amount of "double-breasting" is taking place wherein
large unionized carriers are expanding the nonunion side of the house.
Airlines - The industry with the second biggest bundle of
consequences (after trucking) is the airline industry. Whereas in LTL
trucking all indicators (profits, employment and union membership as well
as wages) appear to be going down, in airlines the patterns are more
complex.
Business and employment have expanded under deregulation. This
point has been well documented. While there have been a few notable
bankruptcies such as Braniff and more recently, Eastern Airlines, the
industry appears to have weathered the impact of increased competition
reasonably well.
The surprising point is that despite growth in revenues,
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compensation has come under considerable pressure. Specifically,
concession bargaining has been very prevalent, with the development of
the B scale most noteworthy. As a result there has been a general
flattening or even a bending of the salary trajectory that had been rising
steadily during the era of regulation. We will return to this interesting
analmoly after we have presented the profile on railroads.
Union density has remained high, in the vicinity of 80 - 90% of the
workforce in airlines. While a few cases of nonunion operations, such as
People Express and Continental, have generated considerable attention the
best estimates are that union density has not dropped by more than 5 -
10% as a result of deregulation.
Railroads - The industry that appears to have evidenced the least
change in the aftermath of deregulation is the railroad industry. Indeed, it
presents an opposite profile to that of airlines, namely, one of continuing
shrinkage in employment yet at the same time preservation of compensation
costs.
The fascinating profile of the railroad industry combines several
elements. The steady run down in employment has continued and if
anything accelerated since deregulation. Over the past 10 years
employment has been cut in half and now stands at approximately 300,000
workers for the railroad industry.
Tonnage carried by the railroads has dropped marginally. In
addition there has been an important shift to commodities, with this part
of the business now accounting for approximately 90% of all freight carried
by the railroads.
Obviously, there has been a very large increase in productivity as
measured by volume carried per worker employed. In his paper Swartz
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indicates that for the 10 year period 1966-1987 productivity increased
approximately 300%. However, for the same period of time compensation
increased about 400% and this is given as the key reason why profit levels
in the railroad industry have remained at low levels, as measured by return
on investment. Some analysts place this figure at approximately 2%.
Explaining the Patterns
An economist would not be surprised by the pattern of results that
have occurred in trucking. All of the measures are down. What would
provoke discussion would be the surprising patterns in airlines and
railroads. The key questions would be the following: Why were the
unions in the airline industry not able to hold or even increase
compensation levels in the face of expanding traffic and employment, and
conversely, why were the unions in the railroad industry able to sustain
(and in some cases increase) compensation levels in the face of declining
employment?
A number of factors interact to produce the patterns just
enumerated for the railroad industry. First, deregulation has not been as
extensive in this industry as in trucking and airlines. But more
importantly, ease of entry for a new carrier is difficult if not impossible
and unlike trucking and airlines where new carriers quickly came on the
scene after deregulation this has not happened in railroads. Consequently,
the competitive pressures that might bring a firm to the brink and force a
reformulation of compensation levels have not occurred except in one or
two isolated instances, such as ConRail.
Certainly the railroads have been anxious to reduce compensation
costs and the low rate of return has motivated top management to focus on
labor costs (railroads have the highest average compensation of any
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industry in the United States) as a prime target. But desire is not
sufficient for bringing about results. Management in the railroad industry
cannot force the issue on changes in compensation in the same manner that
management in the airlines has been able to do - by bringing negotiations
to a point of finality and actually continuing to operate in the face of a
strike. One railroad has attempted to follow this confrontation route to
change, specifically Guilford, but it is really the exception that proves the
rule. Guilford encountered incredible resistance from the unions and the
dispute escalated into a national emergency board and as of this date it is
still not clear whether the long run benefits will be greater than the long
run costs.
Certainly, the solidarity of the railroad brotherhoods must also be
counted as an explanatory factor. The unions are well organized into the
Railway Labor Executives Association and they can use the secondary
boycott as a way of assisting a union that is on the receiving end of a
hard management stance. This is in contrast to the airline industry where
pilots often have crossed the picket lines of other unions, thereby enabling
the employer to continue operations.
The explanation for the surprising pattern of results in airlines has
been already alluded to in the analysis of the railroad industry. For
additional points see the excellent chapter by Peter Cappelli. Basically, he
places most of the weight for the explanation on the variable of union
structure and control. In a period of regulation the airline unions did not
have to be centralized because the coordination was provided by the
automatic passing of wage increases into airline fares. However, once
deregulation hit the industry, and in the face of a few new entrants like
People Express and in the face of aggressive employer strategies
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emphasizing low costs such as those of Frank Lorenzo at Continental
Airlines, the unions (especially the pilots) were not able to stem a tide of
whipsaw activity that reduced relative wages in the industry. The economic
perspective would also note that with union premiums at high levels
(estimated in the vicinity of 50 or 60% for pilot pay) there would have been
considerable difficulty in sustaining these levels without complete union
organization of the labor market and control of contract settlements.
Interestingly, ALPA has moved to assert substantially more control over
contract negotiations on the part of local pilot groups and recently the
erosion of salary scales has been stemmed.
Strateqic Differences Within the Sectors
While the three sectors can be characterized with the general
tendencies just enumerated, substantial and significant differences have
existed within each of the sectors and it is to this subject that we would
now like to turn. In fact, the importance of strategic choice is
fundamental to what we see as the opportunity that is now at hand for the
transportation industry in general. The new partnership situations that
seem to be emerging represent the fashioning of business plans and
organizational strategies that cohere in a consistent way and give a
particular carrier both a business and human resource distinctiveness. In
many respects, the first period of deregulation can be characterized as a
search or, a period of experimentation along the way towards a new
system wherein business objectives and organizational objectives are
aligned.
Truckin - This industry breaks down into several subgroups. At
one end are the large over the road, LTL, carriers that have survived and
even grown during deregulation. Initially, these mega carriers felt the jolt
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of deregulation as the TL end of the business was taken away by new
entrants. But ultimately the infrastructure and the important economies of
scale that accrue to a large carrier with many terminals and many break
bulks has produced steadily increasing tonnage. For example by 1986
Roadway's business had returned to pre-deregulation levels, although it was
almost 100% in the LTL category. The other point to be made about this
end of the spectrum is that it is virtually impossible for a new entrant to
enter the business on such a fully developed scale, given the large network
and computer system that is required to be a major LTL shipper.
The portion of the industry that has been hardest hit has been the
medium sized companies that are not large enough to benefit from full
economies of scale but are too large to rely on a specialty or niche
strategy, such as carrying special materials or serving special regional
markets. In this segment there have been 18 crises wherein workers have
given up wage concessions for stock with the creation of ESOP's.
Significantly, only three of these rescue operations remain in business with
the others having gone bankrupt or having been merged with other
carriers. In his remarks Kinzey Reeves makes the interesting point that
an ESOP creates the stigma of a failing operation and customers shift
business; and if anything the ESOP designation can accelerate the demise.
In terms of innovations in the human resource area not much can be
noted in the trucking industry. The big companies have followed a
"business as usual" as they have coped with the challenge of deregulation
and more recently expanded revenues. Some degree of what might be
termed labor-management cooperation has occurred for those firms that
have been in financial crisis but the orientation has not been long term
given the need to survive, and there has been little change other than
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placing union designated directors on the respective boards. In fact, for
the most part the Teamsters have adopted a reactive stance -- when a
carrier is at the brink they are prepared to negotiate some type of
concession agreement but there is no general approach to fashioning
distinctive programs that help meet the competitive needs of the individual
businesses.
One carrier that has fashioned a program for improving productivity
and focusing the attention of the entire organization on problem solving is
Preston Trucking with its Scanlon plan. While very little in the way of
bonus payments have been forthcoming, the parties credit this program
with substantially better service and improved morale. 1
Airlines - Like trucking a few carriers have survived very well and
grown larger and more profitable. They are referred to as the mega
carriers and include United Airlines, American Airlines, Delta Airlines,
Northwest Airlines, and possibly US Air. Mergers have been instrumental
in producing route structures that enable these large carriers to hold
traffic for the full itinerary of the customers' journey. The hub and
spoke system is a key part of this business strategy - one that effectively
creates the same type of network that benefits the large trucking
companies.
Like trucking, several carriers have found it necessary to seek
concessions to avoid bankruptcy. In several instances these "partnerships
of necessity" have proven successful, such as at Republic Airlines and
Western Airlines where eventual merger with Northwest and Delta
1 For more on Preston and the Scanlon plant see "Preston Trucking
Drives for Productivity", U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-
Management Relations and Cooperative Programs. Labor-Management
Cooperation Brief #13. February 1988.
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respectively, enabled the workers to recoup from the sale of stock what
they had given up in concessions to save these particular companies.
However, in the case of Eastern the partnership did not produce long run
viability and if anything raised expectations that have to some extent
impeded the restructuring of the airline into a competitive carrier.
The most interesting characteristic of the airline industry is that
within the group of large carriers we can observe very different
business/organizational strategies. This is no doubt explained by. the fact
that the direct contact with the customer (in contrast to hauling freight on
the railroads or over the road) that characterizes the airline business sets
the stage for very different approaches. For example, American Airlines
has sought to attract the business traveler and has presented a image of an
airline, very well run by a professional management group. Consistent with
this, management at American Airlines developed in the early 1980's a long
run plan that combined the expansion of routes (with the purchase of new
equipment and hiring of additional employees) with a lowering of its labor
costs by the introduction of a B scale for all employees. As part of the
package it gave employment security to incumbent workers and
communicated extensively the advantages of the proposed solution to the
joint opportunities that the parties faced.
In an opposite corner of the field would be Continental Airlines
with its well known scenario of seeking to attract the flying public via
low fares, made possible by low labor costs realized via the institution of
drastic cuts in compensation levels. Such a strategy may have internal
consistency in terms of economics but it has not been successful in terms
of the workforce consequences as measured by poor service and low morale.
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Somewhere between American- Airlines and Continental Airlines has
been United Airlines that has for certain periods of time followed a "win-
win" approach and at other times a very confrontationial approach to
linking the labor relations side of the business to the strategic objectives
of management. For example, while on the collaborative tack several years
ago United signed a contract that guaranteed continuing employment for all
its pilots in exchange for concessions and the development of an elaborate
feeder system of commuter airlines. However, business fell off during the
recession of the early 1980s and United felt that it had signed a poor deal.
Subsequently, United took a hard line and even attempted to fly in the face
of a strike thereby creating considerable scar tissue that remains to this
day within the organization.
Delta Airlines represents a dramatically different strategy and one
that is probably not available to the other mega carriers. The only craft
group at Delta that is represented by a union is the pilots. For the other
classes of employment the approach of the company is much like that of
IBM that emphasizes full employment, communication programs, good fringe
benefits and a concern for the individual. A few years ago employees
"passed the hat" and bought an air plane for the company as a way of
saying "thank you" for employment security during the down turn o the
early 80's. Such an event would be inconceivable at most other airlines in
the United States.
On the union side there are also some very interesting differences.
The union in the airline industry that comes closest to the "business as
usual" approach of the Teamsters would be the International Association of
Machinists (IAM). Their posture has generally been one of "no step
backward" and they have taken very firm stands at quite a few airlines,
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including Eastern Airlines.
The union that has been most distinctive is ALPA and it has
gradually been embracing a strategy of seeking to gain control and to be a
major player at the strategic level of a number of airlines. One of the
first indications of this was its posture when Trans World Airlines came
into play. Because of the bad experience that ALPA had with Lorenzo and
Continental Airlines it refused to give any concessions to Lorenzo as a quid
pro quo for his purchase of ailing TWA. Yet, ALPA was prepared to grant
significant concession to Icahn and as a result he was able to take control
of TWA. This same use of its power to influence ownership and indeed the
identity of the CEO has been evident in the recent struggle with Frank
Lorenzo for the future of Eastern Airlines.
Another illustration is the effort (thus far unsuccessful) on the
part of ALPA to assume a controlling position in the ownership of United
Airlines. However, its campaign has been partially successful in that
United Airlines has been forced to sell a number of subsidiary businesses
in the hotel and rental car field and to concentrate its activity on airline
transportation.
As Seth Rosen comments in this volume, all of these developments
have meant that "ALPA has much stronger ties with Wall Street".
Railroads - When one looks for differences in corporate strategy
across the major carriers, some variation can be found but not to the
same extent as in airlines. Certainly, partnerships of necessity have
occurred, the previously mentioned Conrail bailout and a type of ESOP at
the Chicago Northwestern representing significant examples. Bankruptcies
have also occurred, for example at the Rock Island.
But when one examines the activities of the major railroads such as
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Norfolk Southern, CSX, Santa Fe, Union Pacific, and Burlington Northern
there has not been much divergence. However, this is changing and
recently some signs have been forthcoming that the major carriers are
starting to explore distinctive strategies for confronting both the business
and human challenges. For example, CSX has joined with its major unions
in a major planning exercise aimed at creating a package of provisions that
would benefit both sides. While this innovative concept of workforce
reduction, sharing the gains with the workers and unions involved and
envisioning considerable changes in work rules makes considerable sense, it
still has not been accepted by some of the key unions especially the UTU
and their rank and file members.
For a while, it looked like Burlington Northern was on the road to a
confrontation as a way of securing changes in operations and compensation
costs that it believed were absolutely necessary. However, more recently,
it appears that the changes are taking place on a case-by-case basis and at
the local level rather than via national negotiations. Similarly, Union
Pacific has been following a low profile approach for the past several years
and has been designating specific locations for improving joint working
relationships and establishing labor participation teams aimed at improving
productivity.
Mention has already been made of Guilford Industries and the
strategy of implementing agreements when bargaining over changes in work
rules and wages reaches an impasse. A number of carriers have reached
for other forms of leverage as means to revise working arrangements. For
example, branch lines have been sold to new operators who have used the
argument: "The line will be shut down unless changes are forthcoming" as
the ultimate form of bargaining power. Several large railroads also have
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subcontracted major operations and again the leverage inherent in the
newcomer has achieved in some instances the simplification of union
structure as well as the elimination of long standing work rules.
Currently, Burlington Northern is in the process of contracting with
General Electric to supply "power by the hour", whereby all the
maintenance work on the locomotives would be done under the jurisdiction
of General Electric rather than Burlington Northern.
The foregoing examples indicate that railroad management (feeling
"locked up" by the union structure as well as by the Railway Labor Act) is
searching for ways in which it can force a series of changes that are high
on its priority list.
Shaping a New Vision
The premise of this conference report is that the transportation
industry has been on the receiving end of a wide range of forces
unleashed by deregulation. It has been forced by circumstances into a
mode of quick response and thus far has not been able to formulate a
vision that puts the pieces together in a coherent. The various sectors
appear poised for new approaches as we close the decade, and also end the
first phase of deregulation. And as we contemplate the 1990s and the
longer run possibilities for transportation in a competitive environment the
parties are in a position to contemplate some new options for the long
run.
In trucking the wave of bankruptcies has subsided. No doubt a few
more casualties will occur but the change in the future will come about as
a result of quality and service. Kinzey Reeves is right in saying that the
dominant driver of deregulation has been price, price, price. And while
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price will continue to be a prerequisite, the enterprise that will thrive in
the future will be one that has much more to offer than price and this will
require the commitment and ingenuity of the total organization.
In airlines the big reality is the extent of bitterness and low
morale that exists at many airlines as a result of takeovers (e.g. forced
implementation of seniority systems), B scale contracts and confrontations.
Workforce commitment is low at Northwest, TWA, United, Eastern and
Continental, to mention some of the major examples where substantial
industrial relations issues remain as a fact of life.
While air transportation is much more of a commodity than it was
during a regulated regime, quality and service distinctiveness will become
even more critical to competitive viability, and consequently the carriers
that maintain and increase market share will be those who offer more than
the commodity of taking a person from point A to point B.
While the railroad industry would appear to be the most status quo
of the three that we have examined closely, it appears to be on the
threshold of some major changes in approach. There have been enough
attempts at both joint planning (CSX) and confrontation (Guilford) to
suggest to the parties that oppertunities exist for some innovative
approaches to change that combine elements of both extremes.
Thus far we have not said very much about the maritime industry
due to the fact that in the United States it is even more "frozen" than the
railroad industry. Everything has been down, down in this industry as the
U.S. share of ocean traffic has slipped precipitously. The industry remains
heavily regulated and much of the traffic that U.S. ships carry is due to
the "set aside" that requires certain shipments to be carried by an
"American flag".
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The exciting glimpse of a model to be emulated comes in Gafney's
description of developments in the maritime industry in other parts of the
world, as well as in the more complete analysis by Richard Walton in his
book Innovating to Compete. 2 The story of how shipping companies in
several countries with strong maritime industries have fashioned a new
model that involves vertical and horizontal flexibility within the workforce,
reduced manning, management teams, crew continuity (attachment to a
particular vessel for an extended period of time), extensive participation
and gainsharing is clearly a model for the U.S. maritime industry to
investigate. Interestingly, this high commitment model has been
implemented quite successfully in a number of manufacturing companies in
the United States especially in autos, steel and telephones.
The high commitment model and its vision of a high performing
workforce that enables the business to maintain or increase market share
is a challenge not only to the U.S. maritime industry but also to the other
major transportation sectors of trucking, airlines and railroads.
Just how this vision might be framed and implemented is a subject
to which we now turn.
On the Road to a New System
Based on a number of developments in the transportation industry
and based on our research 3 with the transformation occurring in U.S.
manufacturing, it is possible to sketch out the markers for the journey to a
new era for transportation.
2 Jossey-Bass, 1988
3 See Thomas Kochan, Harry Katz and Robert McKersie, The
Transformation of American Industrial Relations (Basic Books, 1987).
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Certainly, the beginning point for any major change comes at the
top of the organization. In this connection, it is significant how many
companies, especially in airlines and railroads have changed CEOs over the
past several years. In a number of instances the new executives have
come from outside the transportation sector, bringing with them
perspectives based on experience gained in highly competitive environments
over extended periods of time.
In addition to leadership there must be substantial reason or
pressure to change. A number of factors are beginning to cluster together
to provide this impetus for change. Customers are demanding high levels of
service, and developments, such as just-in-time, are increasing the level of
service required on the part of the transportation sector.
Certainly, the low rate of return is another major spur for the
search for better arrangements. At the conference, Lawrence Pierce, a
banker very knowledgeable about transportation, offered the pungent
observation that financial institutions are paying increasing attention to the
caliber of labor relations before acting on loan applications.- Financial
institutions have become sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate that if a
union is present then the relationship should be constructive and the
workforce willing to operate in new and flexible ways. No doubt when the
bankers require a new look in labor-management relations, management will
take note.
A third marker involves the fashioning of a business strategy that
is articulated and provides a good match between the competitive
environment and the capabilities of the particular organization. Beyond
the important themes of quality and responsiveness to customer needs a
business should frame a distinctive mission or vision for its role in the
19
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market place. Many formulations are possible. On the one hand, there
are carriers that emphasis the delivery of high quality service via attentive
and highly motivated employees, such as Delta Airlines. Then, there are
firms that emphasize tight control and high quality service via
measurement of results, such as United Parcel Service. There are others
that have adopted the theme of coordination of all transportation services
for a shipper via intermodal operations. Specifically, some of the railroad
and trucking companies are advancing their systems as "one stop
transportation service".
The next point of departure involves the fashioning of human
resource and industrial relations policies and programs that align the
commitment and energies of the organization to the business strategy that
has been fashioned to meet the challenges of the market place. Enough is
known about the characteristics of the new organization based on success
stories in manufacturing as well as innovations that have been introduced
in the maritime industry of other countries. 4
The key elements of the high commitment system involve: fair
compensation including gain sharing or profit sharing, employment security,
flexible organization of work with teams and broad classifications, emphasis
on training and the acquisition of new skills, and enhancement of
involvement and participation to tap the knowhow of the full organization.
In a sector such as transportation where service is the key product being
delivered, the loyalty and commitment of the organization are crucial and
the elements of the model just enumerated can facilitate the development
and productive use of this human potential.
4 A summary of these themes is also contained in my piece in the
section of the report on railroads.
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The next ingredient involves the support and active involvement of
the union. (Generally, for the sectors of interest in this report unions are
a reality and will remain a reality.) It is our experience that enterprises
do better by accepting the presence of the union and seeking ways to
develop constructive relationships up and down the line. Too often
companies seek to involve the union at the operating level in behalf of
improving the motivation of the workforce, while at the strategic level
decisions are being taken that weaken the union, e.g. to open up
subsidiaries on a nonunion basis. When firms such as CSX open up a new
computer subsidiary and agree to recognize the Transportation
Communication Union they gain an important advantage. By being willing
to recognize the union a company is able to gain some important changes
in the contract, especially with respect to the structuring of the work
organization.
Most unions in transportation have experienced a "down, down,
down" profile for many years in terms of membership and resources. To
the extent that it is possible for unions to represent new workers (and in
the process the companies can realize important quid pro quos for this
recognition), then the union leadership, especially at the national level, will
be much more willing to be active and constructive partners in the process
of change.
Another sensitive issue has to do with the emergence of holding
companies and the practice of "double breasting", that involves the
aggressive expansion of nonunion subsidiaries. Given some of the problems
that have existed in the unionized sector of transportation, some of these
efforts by companies to break -free and to gain the flexibility and
compensation costs closer to the market are understandable. However, a
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working hypothesis that needs to be tested is that with the kinds of
changes that are beginning to emerge it may be possible for a unionized
operation to be as cost effective as its nonunion counterpart. No doubt the
1990s will provide a major test of this proposition: specifically, can a
company such as American Airlines that is unionized and committed to
developing constructive relations with its unions be as cost effective (even
though paying substantially higher salaries) than a nonunion competitor such
as Continental Airlines?
Another marker for a new system of industrial relations is a
relationship among management, union and employees that is open and
where problems and information are shared on a continuing basis. One
trucking company has used the phrase: "tough trust", which captures the
willingness on the part of management to share information about
everything, including the possibility that certain lines of the business may
have to be shut down or certain drastic steps taken in the face of
competitive challenges. Too often the parties embark upon a cooperative
process, with the assumption that this cooperation will solve all problems -
with the result that the organization is not ready for "bad news". This
sequence appears to have happened at Eastern Airlines. Clearly, a
cooperation partnership has to do more that improve the way people
communicate with one another. There is always the recognition in an open
relationship that there will be "bumps in the road", and it will be necessary
for the parties to confront hard problems and hard decisions.
At the conference one of the commentators, Grindstein, who has
worked in both airlines and railroads commented that it is easier to
engage in a relationship of openness in the railroad industry (and possibly
in trucking) than in airlines because in the former case companies are
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constrained from revealing too much bad news for fear it will have an
adverse impact on the confidence of the customer in the service of the
particular carrier. While this is a reality, most companies have been
pleasantly surprised at the responsibility shown by workers when they are
presented with the factual situation, not through broad side communications,
but through a structure of dissemination that involves front line supervisors
meeting with workers on a one on one and small group basis. The fact
that crews are away from the home base for extended periods of time
presents a very challenging context for the execution of face to face
communications, yet successful carriers have found ways to do this.
A very specific juncture for "tough trust" is the possibility (perhaps
even the necessity) to contract out a piece of the business. An approach
that emphasizes openness and treats the workers who are at risk as adults
would be to lay the facts on the table and to give the part of the
organization that is not "meeting the test of the market" a chance to
respond with a plan to keep the business "in house". Such an approach
has been tried quite successfully by Xerox and its union the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers. Before management takes a decision to
shift operations to a supplier, the department in question is given several
months to formulate a task force and to come forward with a plan that
"beats the competitive bench mark". 5
Management today has considerable leverage, in large part because
of a very competitive marketplace and the ability to divide operations
down into components and to particularlize the competitive issue, for
example, subcontracting the maintenance of locomotives to General
5 See "Tracing a Transformation in Industrial Relations", U.S.
Department of Labor, BLMR 123.
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Electric, or leasing the management of a terminal to an outside contractor,
or hiring a caterer to service the airplanes. Such "leverage" should be used
in a constructive way and if management is willing to move ahead
deliberately and to use the realities of the marketplace to confront the
organization with the need for change, then in more cases than not
constructive solutions will emerge.
Challenges
Some of the perspectives just enumerated will be seen as overly
optimistic and will not track with the experience of many companies that
have found themselves in situations of low productivity/high labor cost and
unable to break out and to achieve modern day organizations. Various
factors are involved. In some cases the organization is populated with
very senior employees (as a result of steady run down of the workforce
and the departure of younger workers) and everyone appears to be waiting
until retirement. In other cases the obstacle can be a particular craft
union that is in jeopardy and is holding up agreement of a new program
that would benefit the majority of the workforce.
There are no easy answers to these challenging situations that seem
to be frozen in the past. Often it is necessary for management to show
its determination to move ahead and to force the workers and unions
involved to confront the need for change. This is the best meaning to
place on the term "confrontation" - to force the organization to squarely
face the existing economic realities. In some instances it will be
necessary for management to take decisive action which might mean the
abandonment of some operations or the sale of some very unproductive
parts of the organization. But the lesson from so many other sectors of
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the economy is that if management exhibits patience and is willing to
come back for a second and perhaps even third round of negotiations, that
ultimately common sense prevails and the longer run needs of all the
stakeholders dominate the opposition that often surfaces in the short run.
While determination is important, it is necessary to infuse it with a
willingness to work collaboratively on projects where the two sides have
common interests, and to use this as a platform for dealing with other
subjects where there may be substantial conflict of interest, at least in the
short run. For example, in a number of relationships the parties have
embraced the important subject of career development of the workforce as
a natural topic for joint programs. Workers who are no longer needed in
one line of a business with enough lead time can be retrained so that they
can move into openings that require new skills. For example, some
railroads have taken workers from declining crafts and retooled them to
handle the expanding information technology part of the business. When
these programs are done on a joint basis the union becomes an important
stakeholder and derives substantial benefit and standing with its members
for the benefits being provided.
The route to a transformed organization is not a dramatic turn
around but a step-by-step process, starting with areas that are natural
"win-win" subjects and moving to more complicated matters as the labor
management relationship matures.
The biggest challenge that management faces is to move steadily and
decisively towards a new system without succumbing to the dangers of
either discussion without change or confrontation that leads to disastrous
conflict. Many examples exist that illustrate both of these extremes. As
Larry Pierce at the conference recognized: "We are expecting a high
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standard of sophistication on the part of companies. We expect them to
bring about highly productive and effective organizations, but to achieve'
this result without lots of strikes and labor turmoil".
We hope that some of the concepts that have been advanced here
will help the parties move successfully down the avenue of planned change
towards organizations that are more economically viable and more
satisfying for all of the stakeholders.
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